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I.

INTRODUCTION'

Ian Martin, the former Secretary General of Amnesty International, recently observed: "Government... are more often motivated
by self-interest than by considerations of humanity, and this provides
a further reason for those seeking to combat human rights violations
to insist upon the right of asylum."2 To insist effectively upon the
right of asylum, one must first ascertain its contours and understand
the state of that right in international law today.
To this end, Part II of this Article discusses first the scope and
legal stature of the three distinct "rights" falling under the umbrella
of the "right of asylum": (i) the right of a state to grant asylum; (ii)
the right of an individual to seek asylum; and (iii) the right of an
individual to be granted asylum. Part II then focuses on the most
uncertain of these rights, the right of an individual to be granted
asylum, and considers whether such a right exists as a matter of
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thank Professor Doug Cassel of DePaul University College of Law for his comments on the
initial draft of this article. Finally, I would like to thank Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of
DePaul University College of Law for inspiring and encouraging me to follow my feelings into
human rights law scholarship.
1. The present inquiry only deals with territorial asylum, asylum within the territory of a
state, not with the related but separate topic of extraterritorial or diplomatic asylum, asylum in
an embassy or a foreign mission of a state.
For a thorough discussion of
extraterritorialldiplomatic asylum, see S. PRAKASH SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971).
2. Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIELE JOLY, REFUGEES: AsYLUM IN EUROPE? vii, vii
(1992) (emphasis added).
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customary international law. Part II concludes with a discussion of a
state's duty not to return a person to persecution (the principle of
non-refoulement). Part III suggests that the development of a right
to be granted asylum could come from the formulation and recognition of an asylum-seeker's right to admission. Part IV then considers
the question of the admission of asylum-seekers by states that, in
principle, could offer aliens refuge from persecution. Finally, Part V
proposes recommendations to improve the protection of persons
fleeing persecution, considering not only the interests of the individuals in need of protection, but also those of individual states, and the
world community of states. It is important to note that the purpose
of this article is not to restate the law of asylum, but to identify trends
and formulate suggestions for new approaches which could serve to
assist persons suffering or fleeing persecution in their home states in
seeking and receiving refuge elsewhere.
If the right of asylum is to play a meaningful role in the system
of protection of individuals fleeing persecution, the issues of admission and burden-sharing must be addressed. Human rights advocates
cannot simply insist upon this right and states cannot refuse to act in
the humanitarian spirit in which they drafted and adopted human
rights and refugee treaties and declarations. In fashioning solutions
to the plight of refugees, the confluence of interests present in the
concept of asylum must be emphasized and humanitarianism must be
perceived as the highest goal.
II. THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. What is Asylum?
The word "asylum" is the Latin counterpart of the Greek word
"asylon," which means freedom from seizure.3 Historically, asylum
has been regarded as a place of refuge where one could be free from
the reach of a pursuer. Sacred places first provided such a refuge and
scholars are of the view that "the practice of asylum is as old as
humanity itself' 4
3. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1972).
Professor Grahl-Madsen explained that the Greek word "asylon" is derived from "a" meaning

"not" and "syle" meaning "right of seizure." Id.

4. SINHA, supra note 1, at 5; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 33
(1993) ("The concept of asylum has been in existence for at least 3,500 years and is found, in

one form or another, in the texts and traditions of many different ancient societies."). See
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Despite its long history and worldwide practice, the term
"asylum" still awaits a universally accepted definition. An authority
in the area of refugee law, the late Professor Atle Grahl-Madsen,
voiced the common observation of scholars that, "[tihe term 'asylum'
has no clear or agreed meaning."5 Notwithstanding this caveat, when
the discussion turns from the meaning of "asylum" as a term to its

meaning as a right, scholars are able to list concrete elements of that
right. Indeed, the right of asylum has been said to comprise certain
specific manifestations of state conduct:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

to admit a person to its territory;
to allow the person to sojourn there;
to refrain from expelling the person;
to refrain from extraditing the person; and
punishing, or otherwise restrictto refrain from prosecuting,
6
ing the person's liberty.

B. The Three Faces of the Right of Asylum
1.

The Right of a State to GrantAsylum.

The right of a state

to grant asylum is well established in international law. It follows
from the principle that every sovereign state is deemed to ,have
exclusive control over its territory and hence over persons present in
its territory.7 One of the implications of this generally recognized

rule is that every sovereign state has the right to grant or deny asylum
to persons located within its boundaries.' Traditionally, thus, in

generally QUADRENI: FOR FORTY YEARS, UNHCR ALONGSIDE REFUGEES 34-62 (UNHCR
Branch Office in Italy ed., 1991) (tracing the history of asylum).
5. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 50 (1980). See-also Kay Hailbronner,
Molding a New Human Rights Agenda, 8 WASH. Q. 183 (1985) (noting that asylum has been the
most difficult of human rights to define).
6. Tom Clark, Human Rights and Expulsion: Giving Content to the Concept of Asylum, 4
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 189, 190 (1992) (citing a United Nations report by Special Rapporteur
Mubanga-Chipoya). These are essentially the facets of the right of asylum identified by
Professor Grahl-Madsen. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 12.
7. Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 1949 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 327, 327.
8. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that "[t]he right of a State to grant
asylum flows from its territorial integrity, which is a pillar of international law."); SiNHA, supra
note 1, at 50 (noting that "[i]nternational law gives every state exclusive control over persons
on its territory" and that consequently, absent contrary treaty obligations, a state may admit
whoever it chooses on whatever terms it desires); Morgenstern, supranote 7, at 327 (noting that
"[a] competence to grant asylum... derives directly from the territorial sovereignty of states.");
S. Prakash Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in InternationalLaw, 10 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 78, 88 (1971) (positing that "[c]ustomary international law does not make it a
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international law, the right of asylum has been viewed as the right of
a state, rather than the right of an individual. 9
There is little dispute as to this general principle of international
law. It is confirmed in international and regional instruments as well
as in state practice. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides in Article 14(1) inter alia the right of each individual to
"enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."" ° The late
Professor Hersch Lauterpacht noted that this wording was introduced

by the British delegation, interpreting it as meaning "'the right of
every state to offer refuge and to resist all demands for extradition.""'.. Professor Lauterpacht commented that such a right is one,
"which every state.., possesses under international law."' 2 Second,
the Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1967 provides in Article 1(1) that,
"[a]sylum granted by a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to
persons entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of

duty of the state to admit aliens into its territory, and if it chooses to admit them it may do so

on whatever terms and conditions its national interests may require.").
9. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1983)
(noting that the "individual... has no right to be granted asylum" and that the right of asylum
"appertains to states."); GRAHL-MADSEN, supranote 5, at 2 (observing that "[t]raditionally, the
'right of asylum' is understood as the right of a State to grant asylum." (emphasis in original));
JOLY, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that "it is the sole prerogative of the recipient state to
recognize refugees and grant them asylum on its territory."); Hailbronner, supra note 5, at 184
(noting that "states remain under no obligation to grant asylum ... to refugees."); Morten
Kjaerum, Article 14, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY
220 (Asborn Eide et al. eds., 1992) (noting that "States have been unwilling to pledge
themselves in international conventions to the individual's right to asylum."); David A. Martin,
ReformingAsylum Adjudication: On Navigatingthe CoastofBohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247,
1253 (1990) (noting that "[c]lassically, the right of asylum under international law belonged to
states and not to individuals."); Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 335 (arguing that the asylumseeker "has no general 'right' of asylum against [the] state."); Paul Weis, Legal Aspects of the
Convention of25 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1953 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 478, 481
(noting that "[a]ccording to general international law as at present constituted, the so-called right
of asylum is a right of States, not of the individual."). Because most states adhere to this view,
the grant of asylum in such states is discretionary with the state. See generally A. Roman Boed,
Comment, PastPersecutionStandardfor Asylum Eligibility in the Seventh Circuit-Bygones are
Bygones, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 158 (1993) (noting that in the United States, it is in the
discretion of the Attorney General whether to grant asylum).
10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14(1), G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
11. Hersch Lauterpacht, The UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, 1948 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 354, 373 (emphasis added).
12. IL
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Human Rights,... shall be respected by all other States."' 3 Further,
the
Article 1(3) of this Declaration vests the state of asylum with
'4
authority "to evaluate the grounds for the grant of asylum.'
Consistent with international instruments, regional instruments
evidence the right of a state to grant asylum. The OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
provides, in Article II(1), that member states of the Organization of
African Unity "shall use their best endeavors consistent with their
respective legislations to receive refugees."' 5 Similarly, the Convention on Territorial Asylum adopted by the Organization of American
States in 1954, stipulates in Article 1 that, "[e]very State has the right,
in the exercise of its sovereignty, to admit into its territory such
persons as it deems advisable, without, through the exercise of this
right, giving rise to complaint by any other State.' 16 The AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Committee, in 1966, adopted Principles
Concerning Treatment of Refugees, Article III(1) of which states that,
"[a] State has the sovereign right to grant or refuse asylum in its
territory to a refugee.' 7 Lastly, in 1977, the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe adopted a Declaration on Territorial
Asylum that in Article 2 reaffirms the right of states to grant
asylum.' 8 Finally, in addition to these regional agreements, many
states have municipal asylum adjudication procedures.' 9
13. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess.,

Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A16912 (1967) (emphasis added). See Paul Weis, The Draft
United Nations Convention on TerritorialAsylum, 1979 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 151,152 [hereinafter
Weis, Draft Convention] (observing that the inclusion of the "in the exercise of its sovereignty"
language in article 1(1) was intended "to make it clear that asylum was not a right of the
individual but the right of States to grant asylum"); Paul Weis, The United Nations Declaration
on TerritorialAsylum, 1969 CAN. Y.B. INTL L. 92, 136 [hereinafter Weis, Declaration](noting
that article 1(1) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum "merely restates a generally recognized
rule of international law.").
14. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 13, art. 1(3).
15. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept.
10, 1969, art. 11(1), 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 48 (emphasis added).
16. Convention on Territorial Asylum, Mar. 28, 1954, OEA/Ser.X/1, art. 1 (emphasis
added).
17. Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees, 1966, art. 111(1), reprintedin UNHCR,
COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES 201, 203 (1979)

(emphasis added).
18. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, Nov. 18,1977, art. 2, reprintedin GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 5, at 212. Article 2 of the Declaration reads in relevant part: "The member states
of the Council of Europe ...reaffirm their right to grant asylum." Id.
19. See Martin, supra note 9, at 1256 (observing that most Western states have asylum
claims systems through which they exercise the discretionary act of granting asylum); Boed,
supra note 9, at 149-53 (discussing the asylum process in the United States).
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2. The Right of an Individual to Seek Asylum. The second
aspect of the right of asylum is the right of an individual to seek
asylum. This is an individual right that an asylum-seeker has vis-a-vis
his state of origin.?° Essentially, it is the right of an individual to
leave his country of residence in pursuit of asylum. The basis for this
right is the principle that "a State may not claim to 'own' its nationals
or residents."'"
This right is enshrined in several international and regional
instruments. Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights proclaims that, "[e]veryone has the right to leave any country,
including his own."'
While strictu sensu the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is not a legally binding instrument, it has been
declared to set forth "the inalienable and inviolable rights of all
members of the human family and [to constitute] an obligationfor the
members of the international community."' Moreover, the Declaration has been said to be "an authoritative expression of the customary
international law of today in regard to human rights."24 The right
of an individual to leave his country can thus be seen as a part of
modem customary international law. With the adoption of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right of an
individual to leave his country became written law binding on the
states parties to the Covenant.' Article 12(2) of the Covenant states
that, "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his
26

own." 1

20. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 2. Note that this individual right does not impose
any obligation on potential or actual receiving states.
21. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, at 26.
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 13(2).
23. Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights
3, at 4, para. 2, 23 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32141 (1968) (emphasis added). But see
Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. LJ. 257,258 (1992) (arguing
that despite pronouncements to the contrary, including the Proclamation of Teheran, the
Universal Declaration "has never been promoted as such, in its entirety, to a ruld of customary
international law.").
24. Weis, Declaration, supra note 13, at 147 citing H. Waldock, General Course of
InternationalLaw, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS 32,33 (1962).

25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., 183d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Note that
as of June 1, 1993, the Covenant has entered into force for 116 states parties. See MANFRED
NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 886 (1993).

26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 12(2).
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This right is also recognized in binding regional instruments.Y
For example, Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" proclaims
that, "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own. ' 29 Similarly, the American Convention on Human Rights'
stipulates in Article 22(2) that, "[e]very person has the right to leave
any country freely, including his 3own."'"
This right has "become
2
part of the written law of nations.
With respect to those states that have become parties to the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,33 those states that have recognized the right of private

petition for the purposes of the European Convention, or states which
have become parties to the American Convention, an individual has
standing to invoke the right to leave his country. This right has also
been vindicated through the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, two functional commissions created by the
United Nations Economic and Social Council under Article 68 of the

27. The right of an individual to leave his own country is also included in the Draft Charter
on Human and People's Rights in the Arab World. The Draft Charter provides in Article 8(2):
"Everyone who is a citizen of an Arab country or of Arab origin has the right to leave his
country and return to it." Draft Charter on Human and People's Rights in the Arab World,
1987, art. 8(2), in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HIGHER STUDIES IN CRIMINAL SCIENCES,

DRAFT CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN THE ARAB WORLD 9 (1987)

[hereinafter DRAFT CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE ARAB WORLD]. Note, however, that
the right to leave one's own country is specifically limited to citizens of Arab countries and to
persons of Arab origin. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ExplanatoryMemorandum: Draft Charteron
Human and People's Rights in the Arab World, in DRAFr CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
ARAB WORLD, supra, at 25, 27 ("It was agreed to link this right with nationality on the one
hand and Arab origin on the other so that both Arab nationals and those of Arab origin who

either lost or were deprived of their nationality could exercise this right (to freely leave and
return)."). Finally, note that the Draft Arab Charter has not yet been ratified or acceded to by
any state and is consequently not yet in force.
28. Council of Europe Agreement No. 46: Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16,1963,7 I.L.M. 978 (1968).
29. Id.art. 2(2).

30. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Off. Rec.,
OEAISer.KJXVI/1.1, Doe. 65 (Rev. 1), Corr. 2 (1970).
31. ld.
art. 22(2).
32. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, at 105.
33. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 183d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N.
Doc. A16316 (1966). Note that as of June 1,1993, the Optional Protocol has entered into force
for 67 states parties. NOwAK, supra note 25, at 886.

8

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 5:1

U.N. Charter.' The right to leave one's own country in pursuit of
asylum is thus a right of the individual asylum-seekers, enforceable in
certain situations."
3. The Right of an Individual to be Granted Asylum.
The
third component right under the umbrella of the right of asylum is the
right of an individual to be granted asylum. While Grotius and
Suarez are said to have recognized the right of asylum as the natural
right of an individual entailing a corresponding state duty to grant

asylum,3 6 this view has not yet been generally recognized under
international law. Felice Morgenstern's view that, "[tihere can be no
doubt that the individual has no general 'right' of asylum against [the]
state,"37 is generally accepted to represent the status of an individual's right of asylum vis-d-vis the state of refuge.38 International and
regional instruments dealing with human rights, asylum, and refugees,
as well as the failure of the international community to agree on a
convention on territorial asylum illustrate the general proposition that,

34. Pursuant to the procedure established under U.N. ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (1970),
thousands of individuals from various countries have invoked Article 13(2) of the Universal
Declaration and the Commission on Human Rights has asked the states concerned to allow the
petitioners to leave their countries. Frequently, the Director of the United Nations Centre for
Human Rights has used his good offices to this end, primarily in cases of family reunification.
Interview with Alfred de Zayas, Senior Human Rights Officer of the United Nations Centre for
Human Rights (May 18, 1994).
35. It is not, however, an unqualified right. Morgenstern notes that a valid state interest
in prosecuting the asylum-seeking individual may supersede the right to seek and enjoy asylum
in accordance with valid extradition treaties. Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 331-35.
In practice, states have at times condoned disregard for the right of an individual to seek
and/or enjoy asylum. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (finding that where appellant had
been kidnapped in Peru and brought to the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"there is no language in this treaty [the Extradition Treaty with Peru] or in any other treaty
made by this country on the subject of extradition, 'which says in terms that a party fleeing from
the United States to escape punishment for a crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in
the country to which he has fled.'"). Abduction of fugitives from a foreign country has again
been recently condoned by the U.S. Supreme Court. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (holding that a forcible abduction from a foreign country does not preclude
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction by a U.S. court, and thus the trial of an abducted
defendant before a U.S. court for alleged violations of U.S. criminal laws, as long as the
extradition treaty does not expressly prohibit such abductions). On the related topic of the
political offense exception in extradition, see M. CHERiF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRAcriCE ch. VIII (3d rev. ed. forthcoming 1994).

36. Weis, Declaration,supra note 13, at 119.
37. Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 335.

38. Note that municipal laws of some states provide for the right of an individual to be
granted asylum in certain circumstances. This point is addressed infra in part I.C.
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in international law today, an individual has no right to asylum
enforceable vis-d-vis the state of refuge.
Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
proclaims the right of an individual "to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution."39 Scholars agree that this
provision merely affords the individual a right to seek asylum, not a

right to receive it.' Professor Lauterpacht criticized the language of
Article 14(1) for giving the individual a right to seek asylum without
specifying whose duty it is to give effect to that right.4 ' Similarly,
with respect to the "enjoyment" of asylum in other countries
postulated by Article 14(1), Professor Lauterpacht noted that since
that provision was intended by its drafters merely to provide for the
right of a state to grant asylum4 (an existing right of states) there
was no need to include it in the Declaration.4' The Declaration thus
did not provide an innovation to existing international law with
respect to an individual's right to receive asylum in a particular state.
The drafting history of Article 14(1), however, reveals that the
drafters of the Declaration contemplated-but ultimately declined to
adopt-any significant innovation in the law of asylum. The original
draft of Article 14 provided that, "[e]veryone has the right to seek
and to be granted, in other countries, asylum from persecution."'
This generous provision would have vested individuals with the right

to asylum vis-d-vis the state of refuge. However, it was changed

39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 14(1), at 4.
40. JOLY, supra note 2, at 15-16 (noting that "[r]efugees are guaranteed the right to 'seek'
asylum but not to obtain it....." (emphasis added)); SINHA, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that
article 14(1) gives the individual "the right to seek and to enjoy asylum, but not to be granted
asylum." (emphasis added)); Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 373 (positing that article 14(1)
provides "a right 'to seek' asylum, without any assurance that the seeking will be successfuL"
(emphasis added)); Sinha, supra note 8, at 91-92 (noting that the Declaration gives an individual
the right to seek asylum, "but not to be granted it." (emphasis added)); Stephen B. Young,
Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 339,347 (Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies ed., 1982)
(observing that while article 14(1) gives individuals the right to seek and enjoy asylum, "[s]tates
are not enjoined to provide such enjoyment upon request.").
41. "It is perhaps a matter for regret that in a Declaration purporting to be an instrument
of moral authority an ambiguous play of words, in a matter of this description, should have been
attempted. Clearly, no declarationwould be necessary to give an individual the right to seek
asylum without an assurance of receiving it." Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 373 (emphasis
added).
42. See supra note 11 and related text (noting that the right to enjoy asylum meant "the
right of every state to offer refuge...." (emphasis added)).
43. Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 373.
44. Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 336 (emphasis added).
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during subsequent deliberations of the Declaration's text. The British,
Australian, and Saudi Arabian representatives objected to obliging
states to grant asylum. 5 The British representative, Mrs. Corbet,
proposed an amendment that read: "[e]veryone has the right to seek
and to enjoy asylum from persecution., 46 Over some objection,4 7
this text was adopted.' By substituting the words "to enjoy" for the
words "to be granted" in Article 14(1), the drafters indicated their
desire not to oblige states to grant asylum to individuals. The
Declaration thus does not give rise to an individual's right to asylum
vis-d-vis the state of refuge or any state in particular.
International instruments adopted subsequent to the Declaration
likewise do not provide for an individual's right to be granted asylum.
In preparing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
states had an opportunity to provide for the right to asylum. During
discussions on the draft Covenant at the Seventh Session of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Yugoslavian
representative voiced a concern that the right to asylum was absent
from the draft. 49 The Yugoslavian representative proposed an
additional article to the Covenant, providing for an individual's right
of asylum. This proposal failed, however, because many representatives did not consider the right of asylum to be an individual's
fundamental right and because there was disagreement as to the class
of persons to whom asylum should be granted." Consequently, the
Covenant, as adopted, contains no provision relating to asylum. Thus,

45. Id.
46. Weis, Draft Convention, supra note 13, at 151.
47. The French representative objected to the weakened right of asylum and was of the
opinion that "'[t]he persecuted would need to receive asylum, not merely the right of asylum."'
Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 337.
48. Id. (noting that the British amendment "which, from the point of view of the individual
for whose protection the whole Declaration is intended-makes the right of asylum meaningless,
was adopted" with thirty votes for it, one vote against it, and twelve states abstaining.).
49. Weis, Declaration,supra note 13, at 96.
50. Proposalsfor Additional Articles Submitted by the Representative of Yugoslavia, 1951
Y.B. ON H.R. 546, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/573. The proposed article provided:

Any person persecuted for his political or scientific convictions, for his activities in the
struggle for national or political liberation or by reason of his race, nationality or
religion or his efforts in support of the realization of the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall have the right
of asylum.

Id. (emphasis added).
51. Weis, Draft Convention, supra note 13, at 151.
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under it, states have no obligation to grant asylum.5 2 Similarly, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is
silent on a right to asylum. 3
The principal international instruments relating to the protection
of refugees, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees'
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,5 5 also do
not provide a right to be granted asylum 6 During the drafting of
the Refugee Convention, France and the United Nations Secretariat
submitted a proposed article providing for, "favourable consideration
to the position of refugees seeking asylum from persecution." 57 The
Ad Hoc Committee on Stateless Persons and Related Problems
accepted this proposal for discussion, but decided not to include
asylum provisions in the operative part of the Refugee Convention. 8
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees explains in the
Handbookon Proceduresand Criteriafor DeterminingRefugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocolrelatingto the Status
of Refugees that, "the granting of asylum is not dealt with in the 1951
Convention or the 1967 Protocol. 5 9 Thus, as with other international instruments, these refugee instruments do not vest an individual
with a right to asylum.
Similarly, regional instruments do not provide for an individual's
right to asylum.'
African and American regional instruments

52. Alfred De Zayas, HumanRights andRefugees, in MIGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICY

25, 26 (International Organization for Migration ed., 1992) (noting that "[s]tates chose not to
restrict their sovereignty").
53. SINHA, supra note 1, at 90.
54. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
55. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.

56. See Martin, supra note 9, at 1255 (noting that the Convention does not guarantee
asylum "even for those duly adjudged to be refugees under its provisions."); Tomuschat, supra
note 23, at 258 (noting that the Refugee Convention "does not confer a right to asylum, but is
essentially confined to regulating the status of those who have been accepted as refugees by a

State.").
57. Weis, supra note 9, at 481.

58. Id. Of course, the grant of refugee status under the Refugee Convention comes very
close to a formal grant of asylum under domestic laws of many states. Permission to sojourn
in a country without a formal grant of asylum provides the individual with refuge, which

amounts to de facto asylum.
59. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 7 (1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].

60. A possible notable exception is the Draft Charter on Human and People's Rights in the
Arab World, providing in Article 40(1): "Every citizen who is subjected to persecution on

political grounds has the right to seek and obtain asylum in any Arab country in accordance with
the law and the provisions of this Charter." DRAFT CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
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address asylum, but do so with great respect for state sovereignty and
thus without much direct benefit for the individual's right to asylum.
The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee

Problems in Africa provides in Article II(1): "[member states] shall
use their best endeavors consistent with their respective legislations to
receive refugees.",6' The American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man provides in Article 27: "Every person has the right, in
case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive
asylum in foreign territory, in accordancewith the laws of each country
and with international agreements."'62 Similarly, the American
Convention on Human Rights provides at Article 22(7): "[e]very
person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign
territory, in accordancewith the legislationof the state and international conventions."6'
Each of these instruments leaves the right of
asylum in the realm of state sovereignty. Equally silent with respect
to the right to asylum is the European Convention on Human
Rights.' It makes no reference to asylum. 6
In light of this background on the right to asylum, it is not
surprising that the 1977 United Nations Conference on Territorial
Asylum, convened with the goal of adopting a Convention on

ARAB WORLD, supranote 27, art. 40(1), at 14 (emphasis added). Note, however, that the Draft
Charter seems to limit the right to seek and obtain asylum to citizens of Arab countries. That
this was the intent of the drafters is not clear. In his Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft
Arab Charter, Professor Bassiouni stated: "Paragraph 1 of Article 40 addresses the possibility
of subjecting an individualto political persecution. It was thus provided that an individual shall
have the right to seek and obtain asylum in any Arab country." Bassiouni, supra note 27, at 29
(emphasis added). Also note that Professor Bassiouni observed that "[t]his article does not
depart from established obligations of states under the international treaties." Id. A right of
an individual to obtain asylum in a state implies an obligation on the part of the state to grant
asylum to that individual. Such an obligation departs from established obligations of states
under international treaties and it is thus doubtful that the drafters of the Draft Arab Charter
actually meant to grant to an individual the right to "obtain asylum in any Arab country" as
Article 40(1) of the Draft Arab Charter seems to do. Whatever the actual right created by
Article 40(1) may be, it is not yet enforceable because the Draft Arab Charter has not entered
into force.
61. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art.
II(1), supra note 15, at 193, 195 (emphasis added).
62. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2,1948, art. 27, O.A.S
Off. Rec. OEAISer.L/VII.23/Doc. 21/Rev.6 (emphasis added).
63. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 22(7), supra note 30, at 207,216 (emphasis
added).
64. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221.
65. Terje Einarsen, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an
Implied Right to de facto Asylum, 2 INT'L J.REFUGEE L. 361, 362 (1990).
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Territorial Asylum, proved to be catastrophic. 6 The Conference was
preceded by a meeting of the Group of Experts, which produced draft
articles of the Convention.67 Article I provided: "[e]ach Contracting
State, acting in the exercise of its sovereign rights, shall use its best
endeavours in a humanitarian spirit to grant asylum in its territory to
any person eligible for the benefits of this Convention."'
The draft articles of the Group of Experts formed the basis of the
discussion of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries, convened by the
Secretary General at the request of the United Nations General
Assembly.69 The Conference designated a Committee of the Whole
to deliberate the draft articles. While the representatives to the
Committee of the Whole agreed on the necessity of reconciling the
right of the state to grant asylum with the persecuted individual's
interest in receiving asylum, they did not agree on the method by
which this should be done.7" Austria, Colombia, Costa Rica, France,
and Italy favored a German proposal for the recognition of a duty to
grant asylum.7 The creation of such a duty would have resulted in
the right of an individual to be granted asylum in the country of
refuge. The majority of the states represented on the Committee of
the Whole, however, favored a text leaving the state the right to grant
asylum.72 Thus, Article I, as adopted by the Committee of the
Whole, reflects the predominant view that the right of asylum is the
right of a state to grant asylum, not the right of an individual to
receive asylum. Article I of the draft Convention reads: "Each
Contracting State, acting in the exercise of its sovereignty, shall
endeavour in a humanitarian spirit to grant asylum in its territory to
any persons eligible for the benefits of this Convention."'73
There was also considerable disagreement among states on other
provisions of the Convention, and the Conference adjourned without
finishing its work.74 The Conference advised the General Assembly

66. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at vii.
67. Weis, Draft Convention, supra note 13, at 154.
68. Id. at 155.
69. I& at 159.
70. Id. at 160.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 161.
73. Id. See also GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 62-63 (setting forth the text of the
adopted articles of the draft Convention).
74. GRAHL-MADSEN, supranote 5, at 61 (noting that "[i]t is hardly possible to speak of any
international consensus with respect to any of the texts which came out of the Committee of the
Whole").
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that work on the draft Convention should be continued, but "[m]ost
Western delegations were not infavour of an early resumption." 5
Once again, the world community passed over an opportunity to grant
to individuals the right to asylum vis-a-vis the state of refuge. As
evidenced by the defeat of the German proposal for a duty of a state
to grant asylum, the will of the international community remains
behind the traditional view that the right of asylum is a right of the
state. Even if the draft Convention on Territorial Asylum were
adopted, in its final form, Article I would have granted to the
individual nothing more than he already had.
The most recent expression of the international community with
respect to the right of asylum suggests that the right of an individual
to be granted asylum has yet to evolve in international law. In June

1993, representatives of 171 states gathered at the World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna.76 In his opening address to the
Conference, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
said: "I believe that at this moment in time it is less urgent to define
new rights than to persuade States to adopt existing instruments and
apply them effectively."' Not surprisingly, the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action adopted by consensus of the 171 states
represented at the Human Rights Conference did not expand the
traditional notion of the right of asylum. Article 23 of the Vienna
Declaration merely reiterates the provisions of Article 14(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "The World Conference on
Human Rights reaffirms that everyone, without distinction of any
kind, is entitled to the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution."" Thus, in international law today, as
before the 1977 Territorial Asylum Conference and the 1993 Human
Rights Conference, the individual has no right to asylum vis-d-vis the
state of refuge.
C. The Right to Asylum in Municipal Law
In the absence of international instruments establishing an
individual's right to asylum, the practice of states may create such a

75. Weis, Draft Convention,supra note 13, at 168.

76. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1993).
77. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Human Rights: The Common Language of Humanity, Opening
Statement of the World Conference on Human Rights (June 14, 1993), in UNITED NATIONS,
WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (1993).
78. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25,1993, in UNITED NATIONS,
WORLD CONFERENCE ON HuMAN RIGHTS 36 (1993).
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right. State practices evidencing international rights are both general
and followed out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).79 With

respect to the right to asylum, it cannot be said that such a right exists
as a matter of customary international law.
The Czech Republic,'m the Federal Republic of Germany,8 ' and
Italy,'2 are among only a few states whose constitutions provide for

an individual right to asylum, and, even then, there is no evidence
that these states do so out of legal obligation rather than humanitarian concern for those in need of asylum. For example, in Germany,
79. See IAN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed., 1990)

(discussing international custom as a source of international law).
80. The Czechoslovak Constitutional Law of January 1991 enacting the Charter of Basic
Rights and Freedoms provides in Article 43 that the Republic "grants asylum to citizens of other
countries, persecuted for invoking political rights and freedoms. Asylum may be denied to one
who acted contrary to fundamental human rights and freedoms." 1STAVNI ZAKON tR
[Constitution] art. 43 (Czech Republic). Although the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has
dissolved as of January 1, 1993, the new Constitution of the Czech Republic in effect from
January 1, 1993 provides in Articles 3 and 112(1) that the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms constitutes a part of the new constitutional order. Id. arts. 3, 112(1).
81. Until May 1993, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Constitution
of the Republic, provided at Article 16(2) that "[p]ersons persecuted on political grounds shall
enjoy the right of asylum." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 16(2) (F.R.G.). This

provision had been interpreted by the German Federal Constitutional Court as directly
enforceable law binding on the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government.
Hailbronner, supra note 5, at 183. Because this provision left no scope for discretion of the
German authorities in evaluating asylum applications, on May 26, 1993, the Bundestag, the
German parliament, voted to amend the constitutional asylum provisions. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS vATCH WORLD REPORT 1994 218 (1993). See also THE FEDERAL
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, SURVEY OF THE POLICY AND LAW CONCERNING FOREIGNERS
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 51 (July 1993) [hereinafter SURVEY OF LAW
CONCERNING FOREIGNERS INGERMANY] (noting that the constitutionally-guaranteed right of
asylum, as originally written, "gave persons suffering political persecution an entitlement to be
granted asylum, leaving no scope for discretion.... This has brought the right of asylum to the
verge of collapse: The right of asylum has more and more turned into uncheckable vehicle of
uncontrolled migration."). The constitutional amendment repealed Article 16(2) and replaced
it with Article 16(a). GG art. 16(a) (F.R.G.). See also Gesetzzur A.nderung des Grundgesetzes
(Artikel 16 und 18) 1993 BGBI 11002 (F.R.G.). While the new constitutional asylum provision
contains a guarantee identical to the provision of the old Article 16(2), "Politisch Verfolgte
geniessen Asylrecht," that is that persons persecuted on political grounds have the right of
asylum, the amendment precludes aliens entering from "safe" countries from invoking this right.
GG art. 16(a) (F.R.G.). See also SURVEY OF LAW CONCERNING FOREIGNERS INGERMANY,
supra,at 53-54 (discussing the constitutional changes); Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmerman, Recent
Changes in German Refugee Law: A Critical Assessment, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1994)
(discussing the new German asylum law); Stefan Tel6ken, The Domino Effect, REFUGEES, Dec.
1993, at 38 (discussing the new German asylum law).
82. Article 10 of the Italian Constitution provides: "A foreigner to whom the practical
exercise in his own country of democratic freedoms, guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, is
precluded, is entitled to the right of asylum within the territory of the Republic, under conditions
laid down by law." CosTrrUzONE [Constitution] art. 10 (Italy).
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the right to asylum was not written into the Constitution out of a
sense of legal obligation but rather out of the desire of the drafters,
some of whom had themselves fled the Nazi regime, to place asylum
"above changing political considerations of conveniency and public
interest.,,sThus, while some states give effect to their prerogative to grant
asylum by creating in their municipal laws the right of an individual
to asylum, such practice is far from general and, even where followed,
does not constitute opinio juris.' It is therefore evident that the
right of asylum in international law today consists of only the first two
components identified by Professor Grahl-Madsen: (i) the right of a
state to grant asylum, and (ii) the right of an individual to seek
asylum-the asylum-seeker's right vis-d-vis his state of origin.' 5 To
date, no international instrument or custom vests the individual with
a right to be granted asylum, a right vis-ti-vis the state of refuge.
D. The Duty not to Return a Person to Persecution: the Principle of
Non-Refoulement
Although non-refoulement is not as sweeping as the right of
asylum, it provides an asylum-seeker with at least a temporary refuge
and thus partial or de facto asylum 6 The principle of nonrefoulement is understood in international law as the duty of a state
not to return a person to a place of persecution. Professor GrahlMadsen notes that the duty of non-refoulement was first imposed in
Article 3(2) of the Convention relating to the International Status of
Refugees': "Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes, in all cases,
not to return refugees across the frontiers of their country of
Paul Weis, the former Director of the Legal Division of
origin."'

83. Hailbronner, supra note 5, at 183. A Survey of the Policy and Law Concerning
Foreignersin the FederalRepublic of Germany issued by the German Federal Ministry of the

Interior supports this point further.
At the time [under the Nazi regime], a lot of Germans had only survived because they
were admitted to and protected in other countries. That is why the right of asylum in
the Federal Republic was worded very generously and went beyond the international
law and the right of asylum granted by any other state.
SURVEY OF LAW CONCERNING FOREIGNERS iN GERMANY, supra note 81, at 51.

84. GOODwIN-GIL, supranote 9, at 121 (noting that "[s]tate practice... permits only one
conclusion: the individual still has no right to be granted asylum.").
85. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 2.
86. For a thorough discussion of the principle of non-refoulement, see GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 9, at 69-97.
87. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 40.
88. Il
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the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
contrasts asylum and non-refoulement in the following manner:
"Asylum entails admission, residence and protection; non-refoulement
is a negative duty, not to compel a person to return to a country of
persecution."89 Nothing in the principle of non-refoulement, however, precludes a state from sending an asylum-seeker to a country in
which he would not be persecuted.' °
Today, binding and non-binding international, regional, and
91
municipal instruments provide for the principle of non-refoulement.
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees (entitled Prohibition of Expulsion or Return
("refoulement")) provides that,"[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened."'
Article 42(1) of the Convention specifically designates Article 33 as
one of the articles to which a state may not make reservations. 93 It
must be noted, however, that the Convention is not universal but only
binds those 110 states that are parties to it. Moreover, the duty of
non-refoulement contained in Article 33(1) exists only with respect to
persons determined to be refugees under the Convention. Additionally, Article 33(1) as written provides no right of admission for the
purpose of seeking asylum.94
Article I(1) of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention thus making the
duty of non-refoulement expressed in article 33(1) of the Convention
binding on states parties to the Protocol.95

89. Weis, Draft Convention, supra note 13, at 166.
90. See iL (noting that the application of the principle of non-refoulement does not
necessarily lead to a grant of asylum and that the "country concerned may admit the person only
temporarily, or expel him to another country in which he does not fear persecution.").

91. For example, § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect in the United
States provides for mandatory withholding of deportation of any alien to a country if, "[the
alien's] life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)
(1988).
92. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 54, art. 33(1).
93. Id. art. 42(1).
94. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 40 (stating that Article 33 "may only be invoked in
respect of persons who are already present-lawfully or unlawfully-in the territory of a
Contracting State" and that "it does not obligate the Contracting State to admit any person who

has not already set foot in its territory.").
95. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 55, art. I(1).
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The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment also prohibits refoulement.6
Article 3(1) stipulates: "No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler')
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture."' A comparison of the non-refoulement provisions of the
Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture manifests
an apparent difference in the category of persons protected from
refoulement. While the Refugee Convention only protects those
determined to be refugees under its provisions, the Convention
Against Torture extends its protection against refoulement to any
person who would be in danger of being subjected to torture. This
difference is less significant than might appear. A person who would
be in danger of being subjected to torture, as that term is defined in
the Convention Against Torture,98 would not only be protected from
refoulement by the Convention Against Torture but would also likely

96. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 197, U.N. Doc. A139/51 (1984).
97. Id. at 198. In its first decision applying Article 3(1) of the Convention Against Torture,
the U.N. Committee Against Torture recently decided that Switzerland, the state party in
question, would violate its non-refoulement obligation under the Convention should it expel the
petitioner, a deserter from the Zairian Army, to Zaire where he allegedly faced persecution.
Mutombo v. Switzerland, Comm. No. 13/1993 (1994) (forthcoming) (transcript on file with
author). In reaching this decision, the Committee considered all relevant information including
the serious human rights situation in Zaire, the petitioner's ethnic background, alleged political
affiliation, detention history, and the fact that he deserted from the Army and left Zaire
clandestinely. Id.
9.4 and 9-5. The Committee's decision, however, is limited rationetemporis
and ratione loci. Switzerland may not expel Mr. Mutombo "in the prevailing circumstances,"
but presumably may do so if circumstances change. Moreover, Switzerland is free to expel Mr.
Mutombo to any country where he would not face the risk of being returned to Zaire or of
being subjected to torture. See id. 1 10 (noting that "the State party has an obligation to refrain
from expelling [Mr.] Mutombo to Zaire, or to any other country where he runs a real risk of
being expelled or returned to Zaire or of being subjected to torture.").
98. The Convention Against Torture defines the term "torture" as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, supra note 96,

art. 1(1).
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be considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution under the
Refugee Convention, thus qualifying for its protections as well.99
A significant difference between the scope of the non-refoulement
provision of the Refugee Convention and that of the Convention
Against Torture, however, might lie in the application of each treaty
to the rejection of aliens at a nation's border. Although by its terms
neither treaty prohibits rejection at a border, the U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee
Convention to have no extraterritorial effect. Thus, in the Court's
view, it is not prohibited to return or reject aliens who have not yet
entered the territory of the intended state of refuge."° The nonrefoulement provision of the Convention Against Torture, on the
other hand, has not yet been so limited. Indeed, with respect to the

99. The Refugee Convention defines the term "refugee" as any person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country ....
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 54, art. l(A)(2). While the Refugee
Convention does not define the term "persecution," in the Handbookon Proceduresand Criteria
for DeterminingRefugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocolrelatingto the
Status of Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees noted that while no "universally
accepted" definition of "persecution" exists, "a threat to life or freedom on account of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group is always
persecution. Other serious violations of human rights-for the same reasons-would also
constitute persecution." HANDBOOK, supra note 59, clause 51, at 14. The Handbook,however,
does not elaborate on what constitutes a serious violation of human rights. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is instructive on customary international law regarding human
rights. See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text (discussing the Universal Declaration's
effect on customary international law in the area of human rights). The Universal Declaration
stipulates, for example, that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, supra note 10. Moreover, Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration explicitly proscribes torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment. ld.
art. 5. Clearly, torture is both a "serious violation of human rights" and could
well be a "threat to life or freedom." Provided it was carried out because of one of the
stipulated reasons, torture would amount to persecution within the meaning of the Refugee
Convention.
100. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993). But see Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2567
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority incorrectly defines "return" in order to
"strain to sanction" the U.S. Government's interception of fleeing refugees) and 1981 Conclusion
No. 22 (XXXII), Protectionof Asylum Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, adopted by
the Executive Committee on International Protection of Refugees of the UNHCR Programme,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CONCLUSIONS ON THE

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 49 (1992) [hereinafter CONCLUSIONS] (noting at

section II(A)(2) that "[i]n
all cases the fundamental principle of non-refoulement-includingnonrejection at the frontier-must be scrupulously observed." (emphasis added)).
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extraterritorial effect of the Convention Against Torture, Professor
Christian Tomuschat suggests:
Since the paramount objective is protection from torture, one will
have to conclude here that refoulement is to be interpreted in a
broad sense as comprehending any form of State action, including
rejection at the border. Article 3 [of the Convention Against
Torture] proceeds from the assumption that governmental authorities surrendering a person to the authorities of another State that
habitually practices torture would themselves become accomplices
of the crime of torture. In that perspective, the subtle legal
distinction between returning someone who has already put his foot
on the territory of the desired host State, and preventing another
person from performing that symbolic act becomes immaterial. 10 1

The non-binding Declaration on Territorial Asylum contains an
unambiguous provision with respect to non-refoulement in that it
Non-refoulement
explicitly prohibits "rejection at the frontier."'"
provisions also appear in the OAU Convention Governing the

Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,"° Principles
Concerning Treatment of Refugees adopted by the Asian-African
Legal Consultative Committee,' American Convention on Human

101. Tomuschat, supra note 23, at 259.
102. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 13, art. 3(1) (providing: "No person...
shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier."). Note, however, that Article
3(2) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum allows an exception to non-rejection "for
overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of
a mass influx of persons." Id.
With respect to non-rejection in cases of mass influx of persons, the 1981 Conclusion No.
22 (XXXII) of the Executive Committee on International Protection of Refugees of the
UNHCR Programme recommends: "In situations of large-scale influx, asylum seekers should
be admitted to the State in which they first seek refuge and if that State is unable to admit them
on a durable basis, it should always admit them at least on a temporary basis and provide them
with protection." CONCLUSIONS, supra note 100, § II(a)(1), at 49.
103. Article 11(3) of the OAU Convention provides: "No person shall be subjected by a
Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would
compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would
be threatened." OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, supra note 15, art. 11(3).
104. Article 11(3) of the Principles provides: "No one seeking asylum ...should, except for
overriding reasons of national security or safeguarding the populations, be subjected to measures
such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion which would result in compelling him to
return to or remain in a territory if there is a well-founded fear of persecution endangering his
life, physical integrity or liberty in that territory." Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees,
supra note 17, art. III(3).
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Rights,"05 Council of Europe Resolution on Asylum to Persons in
Danger of Persecution," and the Draft Charter on Human and
People's Rights in the Arab World." 7

Although the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not contain a specific non-refoulement provision, its
Article 7 prohibits torture."° The United Nations Human Rights
Committee said that under Article 7: "States parties must not expose

individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of
their extradition, expulsion, or refoulement."'
While many scholars agree that the principle of non-refoulement
has acquired "a high degree of general acceptance,""' their opinions
differ as to whether non-refoulement has become a part of customary
international law."'

The practice of states attests to the uncertain

105. In language similar to Article 33(1) in that it does not provide for non-rejection at the
frontiers, Article 22(8) of the American Convention provides: "In no case may an alien be
deported or returned to a country... if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is
in danger of being violated." American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 22(8).
106. Article 2 of the resolution provides that member governments, "should... ensure that
no one shall be subjected to refusal of admission at the frontier, rejection, expulsion or any other
measure which would have the result of compelling [an asylum-seeker] to return to, or remain
in, a territory where he would be in danger of persecution .... " Resolution 14 (1967) on
Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution, June 29, 1967, art. 2, in OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES 305 (1992). Cf. Einarsen, supra note 65 (arguing that
jurisprudence under the European Convention on Human Rights indicates an emergence of an
implied right to de facto asylum).
107. Article 40(2) of the Draft Charter provides: "No person enjoying asylum or seeking it
shall be expelled to an Arab or foreign country where his life would be in danger or where he
may be persecuted." Draft Charter on Human and People's Rights in the Arab World, 1987,
art. 40(2), in DRAFT CHARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE ARAB WORLD, supra note 27, at 15.
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 7.
109. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20/44 of 3 Apr. 1992
[Prohibition of Torture] para. 9, reprintedin NOWAK, supra note 25, at 872 (emphasis added).
110. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 42. See also 1977 Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII), NonRefoulement, adopted by the Executive Committee on International Protection of Refugees of
the UNHCR Programme ("EXCOM") in CONCLUSIONS, supra note 100, at 14 (noting that "the
fundamental humanitarian principle of non-refoulement has found expression in various
international instruments adopted at the universal and regional levels and is generally accepted
by States."); 1979 Conclusion No. 15 (XXX), Refugees Without an Asylum Country, adopted by
EXCOM in CONCLUSIONS, id., at 31 (listing under the heading "General principles": "(b) Action
whereby a refugee is obliged to return or is sent to a country where he has reason to fear
persecution constitutes a grave violation of the recognized principle of non-refoulement.").
111. CompareKay Hailbronner, Nonrefoulement and "Humanitarian"Refugees: Customary
InternationalLaw or Wishful Thinking?, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW INTHE
1980S 123, 128 (David A. Martin ed., 1988) ("Commentators have taken the view that the
principle of nonrefoulement must be considered today as a rule of customary international law.
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status of the non-refoulement principle in customary international law.
Even though many of the states that are bound by the nonrefoulement provision of the Refugee Convention and Declaration
observe this provision and refrain from returning home those fleeing
persecution,"' the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
recently expressed concern that, "[a] number of countries,where the
admission or presence of certain groups of refugees have been
perceived as incompatible with national interests or domestic
concerns, have ignored or undermined the principle of nonrefoulement.""' In particular, the High Commissioner has identified rejection at frontiers, interceptions, push-offs, and forcible return
of asylum-seekers as current threats to non-refoulement."4 Although the principle of non-refoulement provides a duty not to return
an asylum-seeker to a place where he would be persecuted, it does
not provide a duty to grant him asylum or a duty not to send him
elsewhere. In practice, the principle of non-refoulement often
amounts to little protection from persecution."'

Whether this view finds sufficient support in a virtually uniform and extensive state practice
accompanied by the necessary opinio juris is doubtful." (citations omitted)) and Sinha,
AnthropocentricView, supranote 8, at 93 ("customary international law gives the state complete
freedom to expel an alien.... States are under no duty of non-refoulement under this law.")
with GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 97 (noting that the principle of non-refoulement "forms
part of general international law. There is substantial, if not conclusive, authority that the
principle is binding in all states, independently of specific assent.") and THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS 123 (Louis

B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992) ("The general prohibition against a State's return
of a refugee to a country where his or her life would be threatened ... has become a rule of
customary international law.").
.
112. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on International Protection,
submitted to Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme on Aug. 31, 1993,
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/815 (1993).
113. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 4. See also Oldrich Andrysek, Statement before Council on Security and
Cooperation in Europe Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues (Sept. 27 - Oct.
15, 1993) ("While the overwhelming majority of democratic States demonstrate a commitment
to the principle of non-refoulementand continue to practice generous asylum policies, rejection
at frontiers, interceptions and push-offs, forcible returns to danger and expressions of
xenophobia do occur with increasing frequency." Id. at 5).
115. An example on point here is the case of the Haitian asylum-seekers whom, until June
1994, were systematically interdicted by the United States in international waters. The Haitians
were then returned to their homeland where many of them feared persecution. See Symposium,
The HaitianRefugee Crisis:A Closer Look; 7 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ.1 (1993) (discussing in detail
the U.S. policy of interdictions on the high seas). On May 9, 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton
announced a change in this interdiction policy. See Transcriptof Remarks by President Clinton
in Press Conference on Haiti,U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File. The new policy still includes U.S. interdictions of all Haitians found at sea but

1994]

RIGHT OF ASYLUM

III. REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF THE RIGHT OF
ASYLUM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Professor Grahl-Madsen's three-faceted conception of the right
of asylum considers the right of the state to grant asylum, the right of
an individual to seek asylum, and the right of an individual to be
granted asylum." 6 Under international law, states have a right to
grant asylum and a duty not to prevent those who wish to emigrate
or seek asylum elsewhere from doing so. States parties to one or
more international or regional treaties that prohibit refoulement also
have a duty under such instruments not to return protected persons
to states in which they would face persecution. Additionally,
customary international law may impose a duty of non-refoulement
upon states, although this principle is not, at present, settled law. On
the other hand, under international law, individuals have an implied
right to seek asylum. People have a right to leave their own country,
and in some cases, a right, implied from the non-refoulement duty of
a state, not to be returned to a place where they would face persecution. However, individuals have no right under international law to
be granted asylum.
The duty of a state not to return a person to a place where he
would face persecution is presently the closest that an individual
comes to a right to asylum in international law. Yet even in the best
case with respect to non-refoulement-a case where, pursuant to an
international or a regional multilateral treaty, a state is obliged not to
return a person to a place where he would suffer persecution-the
state has no express duty to allow an asylum seeker to enter its
territory. This position was recently confirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council."7 Sale held
that the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention/Protocol does not apply extraterritorially."' This interpretation
allows a state to turn away asylum seekers not yet in its territory,

affords the interdicted persons asylum interviews aboard U.S. ships. Iai
116. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 2.
117. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
118. Id. But see Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting Persecutors:The Seizure and
Return of Haitian Refugees in Violation of the U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol,7 GEO.
IMMIGR. LU. 67, 79 (1993) (arguing that the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee
Convention/Protocol "applies to refugees wherever they are outside the country of persecution.").
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even if these people would face persecution elsewhere." 9 Sale's
interpretation is the primary threat to the principle of nonrefoulement. For if there is no right of an individual to admission, the
individual's implied right to even an imperfect asylum (by virtue of
non-refoulement) is illusory. Advocates wishing to insist upon the
right of asylum should thus first insist upon the right of admission.
IV. THE RIGHT OF ADMISSION
Admission of aliens into the territory of a state has been
traditionally regarded to be within the realm of state sovereignty and,
in international law, remains so to the present.' There does not
exist a binding international treaty restricting the authority of states
to deny an alien admission. Consequently, states continue to regulate
the access of aliens to their territories. At times, states give effect to
119. But see Tomuschat, supra note 23, at 259 (noting that under the Convention Against
Torture, "[s]ince the paramount objective is protection from torture, one will have to conclude
...that refoulement is to be interpreted in a broad sense as comprehending any form of State
action, including rejection at the border."). Under Professor Tomuschat's reading of the
Convention Against Torture, a state would clearly not be able to turn away to torture those not
yet in its territory. For a discussion of possible extraterritorial application of the Convention
Against Torture see supra part II.D.
120. BROWNLIE, supra note 79, at 519 ("a state may choose not to admit aliens or may
impose conditions on their admission."); GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, at 197 ("The several
States have jealously guarded their freedom to decide which aliens or categories of aliens they
will let enter their territories."); SINHA, ASYLUM, supra note 1, at 108 ("under customary
international law a state is free to admit or not admit aliens."); THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 111, at 106 ("There are no international conventions which

require the admission of refugees and displaced persons, nor has there arisen any such
requirement under customary international law. Consequently States are free to enact their own
laws and regulations governing such admission."); Karl Doehring, Aliens, Admission, in I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-09, 107 (1992) ("State practice
[concerning admission of aliens] demonstrates that the discretion of governments in this respect
has nearly no limitation."); Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 327 ("[t]here is an undisputed rule of
international law to the effect that every state has exclusive control over the individuals on its
territory." From this rule flows the principle of states' competence over the regulation of
admission of aliens into their territories.). But see RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS

95-96 (1984) (noting that the European
Commission on Human Rights' decision on admissibility of East African Asians cases showed
that "a State's absolute right under traditional international law to decide whether to admit
aliens on to its territory is becoming obsolete. Under contemporary international law the right
should be deemed to be subject to the important proviso that a State cannot exercise its right
of admission in a fashion which is racially discriminatory in effect." (citations omitted)); James
A.R. Nafziger, A Commentary on American Legal Scholarship Concerning the Admission of
Migrants,17 J.L. REFORM 165, 167 (1984) (arguing that, "although a state certainly has no duty
to admit all aliens who might seek to enter its territory, it has a qualified duty to admit aliens
when they pose no threat to the public safety, security, public welfare, or essential institutions
of a recipient state.").
OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNAIONAL LAW
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their territorial sovereignty by rejecting asylum-seekers at their
borders, forcing the aliens to seek another place of refuge or, in the
worst situation, to return to the countries from which they have

fled."' Although one non-binding international instrument and one
binding regional multilateral treaty prohibit rejection of asylumseekers at the borders, no binding international instrument expressly
takes this step. This situation leaves the majority of states without a
legal obligation to admit asylum-seekers.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights" 2 declares that,
"[e]veryone has the right to leave any country,... and to return to
his country"'" and "the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution"'2 4 without in any way providing for the
right of an individual to be admitted to any country but his own." 5
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
binding on states parties to it, 26 provides for the right of everyone
to "be free to leave any country"' 27 without providing the collateral
right of admission to another country.'2

121. The recent U.S. policy of interdicting Haitian asylum-seekers on the high seas and
returning them to their homeland from which they fled illustrates the latter scenario. See
generallySymposium, supranote 115 (discussing the interdiction policy). Forcing aliens to seek
another place of refuge creates a problem known as "refugees in orbit." See generally GORAN
MELANDER, REFUGEES IN OPRIT (1978).
122. See supra notes 23 & 24 and related text (discussing the legal force of the Universal
Declaration).
123. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, art. 13(2).
124. Id. art. 14(1).
125. See SiNHA, ASYLUM, supra note 1, at 109 (noting that the drafting history of the
Universal Declaration shows that under its provisions, "refugees would not have a right to be
admitted."). See generallysupra notes 44-48 and related text (discussing the drafting history of
article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration).
126. As of May 1, 1994, the Covenant has entered into force for 116 states parties. See
NOWAK, supra note 25, at 886.
127. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 12(2).
128. The U.N. Human Rights Committee acknowledged this in their General Comments.
In General Comment 15/27 of 22 July 1986 [Position of Aliens], the Committee stated: "The
Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State
party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory."
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENTS ADOPTED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE UNDER ARTICLE 40, PARAGRAPH 4 OFTHE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL

AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, General Comment 15/27 of 22 July 1986 [Position of Aliens] para. 5,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1 (1989). The Committee, however, did note that "in certain
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or
residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman
treatment and respect for family life arise." Id.
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The principal international instrument for the protection of those
falling within the scope of its "refugee" definition,129 the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, stipulates the duties of
a state of refuge with respect to refugees on its territory but does not
impose on states parties to it the duty to admit persons fleeing
Article 31(1) of the Convention provides: "The
persecution.13
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who.., enter or are present in
Article 32(1) prohibits
their territory without authorization."''
"a refugee lawfully in
expelling,
states parties to the Convention from
their territory save on grounds of national security or public orFinally, Article 33(1) prohibits the expulsion or return
der."''
('refouler') of, "a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
1 33
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.
Articles 31 and 32 of the Refugee Convention expressly apply
only to refugees present in the territory of the state of refuge-they
do not mandate that states allow the entry of refugees. Unlike
Articles 31 and 32, Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention does not
by its terms refer only to refugees already present in the territory of
the state of refuge. Commentators believe, nevertheless, that at the
time of Article 33's drafting, the duty of non-refoulement applied only
to refugees already present in the territory of the state of refuge."
Some commentators ae of the opinion, however, that Article 33,
through declarations and state practice, at present prohibits the
rejection of refugees at a frontier. 35 Nonetheless, state practice
129. See supranote 99 (setting forth the "refugee" definition used in the Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees).
130. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, at 196 (noting that "States have no international
legal duty to admit refugees who present themselves at their frontiers and ask for asylum.");
SINHA, ASYLuM, supranote 1,at 109 (stating that the "[Refugee] Convention... merely forbids
states from imposing penalties for illegal entry or presence, but it does not oblige them to admit
refugees.").

131. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 54, art. 31(1) (emphasis
added).

132. Id. art. 32(1).
133. Id. art. 33(1).
134. GOODwwn-GIL, supra note 9, at 74 ("[T]he fact remains that states were not prepared
to include in the [Refugee] Convention any article on admission of refugees; non-refoulement

in the sense of even a limited obligation to allow entry may well have been seen as coming too
close to the unwished-for duty to grant asylum."); GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 5, at 40 ("Article
33 only prohibits the expulsion or return (refoulement) of refugees... ; it does not obligate the
Contracting State to admit any person who has not already set foot in its territory.").
135. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 77-78 ("By and large, states in their practice and in
their recorded views, have recognized that [the duty of non-refoulement] applies to the moment
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does not show a uniform acceptance of the prohibition against
rejecting refugees at borders.136 Additionally, Sale demonstrates
that at least one major state does not accept the proposition that nonrejection of refugees who have not yet set foot in the territory of the

state of intended refuge is a part of the principle of non137
refoulement.

While it is unclear whether Article 33 of the Refugee Convention
has evolved through the practice of states so as to include the duty of
non-rejection at the border or extraterritorially, the non-refoulement
provision of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has been well
argued to include such a duty.13 1 It is possible that states parties to

at which asylum-seekers present themselves for entry. Certain factual elements may be
necessary (such as human rights violations in the country of origin) before the principle of nonrefoulement is triggered, but the concept now encompasses both non-return and non-rejection."
(emphasis added)); GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT 176 (1989)

("The majority of authors nowadays clearly agree that Article 33 must be considered to include
non-rejection at the frontier.").
This opinion is not, however, universally accepted. For example, Hailbronner points out
that in 1976, Sadruddin Aga Khan, then the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
"rejected the suggestion that the nonrefoulement rule could be considered a general obligation
to admit refugees who present themselves at the border." Hailbronner, supra note 111, at 127.
Hailbronner also notes that based on the Refugee Convention, the duty of non-refoulement "is
limited to those who have already entered state territory, either lawfully or unlawfully." Id at
126. On the other hand, Hailbronner concedes Goodwin-Gill's point that "[sitate practice, along
with the recorded views of states and the general development of human rights concepts,
supports an acceptance of a broad understanding of the non-refoulementrule contained in article
33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention." Id at 127 (citation omitted).
136. See supra notes 113 & 114 and related text (citing the concerns of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees regarding rejection of refugees at frontiers).
137. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). But see supra note 100
(listing authorities arguing that the principle of non-refoulement applies extraterritorially and
thus encompasses non-rejection of refugees at frontiers).
138. See supra note 101 and related text (containing Professor Tomuschat's argument that
since the principal objective of the Convention Against Torture is protection against torture,
"the subtle legal distinction between returning someone who has already put his foot on the
territory of the desired host State, and preventing another person from performing that symbolic
act becomes immaterial." Tomuschat, supra note 23, at 259.). Of course, a similar argument
could be made with respect to the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention. One
could argue that since the principal objective of the Refugee Convention is the protection of
refugees from persecution, it should be immaterial for triggering the non-refoulement protection
of the Refugee Convention whether the refugee fleeing persecution has set foot on the territory
of the state. As compelling as this argument is, the extraterritorial effect of the non-refoulement
provision of the Refugee Convention has already been undermined by state practice and by a
judicial decision. See supra notes 136 & 137 and related text. Additionally, the drafting history
of the Refugee Convention indicates that when written, Article 33 only applied to refugees
already in the territory of the state of refuge. See supra note 134 and related text.

28

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 5:1

the Convention Against Torture have a duty not to reject aliens from
their frontiers, at least in situations involving "substantial grounds for
believing that [those aliens] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture''139 in the state to which they would return. Although the
Convention Against Torture does not expressly prohibit the rejection
of aliens at frontiers,"4 it nevertheless holds out the most promise
among the binding international instruments for the creation of a duty
of a state to not reject aliens seeking asylum. This possibility,
however, does not change the fact that no binding international
instrument expressly prohibits the rejection of aliens at frontiers, even
in compelling circumstances involving persecution and torture. States
are reluctant to give up their sovereign prerogative to unilaterally
decide who to admit to and who to exclude from their territories.
When states have agreed to the principle of non-rejection, they have
done so only in the form of a non-binding declaration.'4 1

On the regional level, the situation is better for the alien seeking
admission to an intended state of refuge. In Africa, 42 states parties

to the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee

139. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 96, art. 3(1).
140. The Convention Against Torture expressly prohibits only expelling, return ("refouler"),
and extradition. Article 3(1) stipulates: "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Id.The only Article 3 case decided by the
Committee Against Torture, Mutombo v. Switzerland, involved a Zairian citizen who had
already entered into the territory of Switzerland, the state seeking to return him to Zaire. See
supra note 97 (discussing the Mutombo case).
141. The Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1967 recommends that states base their practices relating to territorial asylum on
principles including non-rejection. In Article 3(1), the Declaration states: "No person... shall
be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier." Declaration on Territorial Asylum,
supra note 13, art. 3(1) (emphasis added). But even in this non-binding Declaration, states did
not accept non-rejection as a non-derogable principle and consequently Article 3(2) allows an
exception to non-rejection "for overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard
the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons." Id.art. 3(2). But see CONCLUSIONS,
supra note 100, (stating UNHCR recommendations on admission of asylum-seekers in cases of
mass-influx).
The 1977 Conference on Territorial Asylum confirmed the reluctance of states to bind
themselves to the principle of non-rejection. At the Conference, "all proposals to commit states
to grant refugees a right of entry were defeated." Hailbronner, supra note 111, at 127 (citing
views of Sadruddin Aga Khan). See generally Weis, Draft Convention,supra note 13 (discussing
the various proposals bearing on the right of entry).
142. See generally STENBERG, supra note 135, at 249-52 (discussing the evolution of the
principle of non-refoulement in Africa).
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Problems in Africa 4 3 have an express duty of non-rejection from
their frontiers. This duty applies with respect to any person falling
within the "refugee" definition of the OAU Convention'" who, if
rejected, would be compelled to "return to or remain in a territory
where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened."' 4 5
Additionally, the normative but non-binding Principles Concerning
Treatment of Refugees' 46 adopted by the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committee advise:
No one seeking asylum.., should, except for overriding reasons of
national security or safeguarding the populations, be subjected to
measures such as rejection at the frontier ...which would result in
compelling him to return to or remain in a territory if there is a
well-founded fear of persecution endangering his life, physical
integrity or liberty in that territory.147
Although under their regional instruments Latin America,
Europe, and the Arab states do not presently have a legal duty to
refrain from rejecting aliens from their frontiers, positive developments in these regions can be seen in the form of normative instruments. In Latin America, ten states'48 adopted the non-binding
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees which in Article 5 states that the

143. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, supra

note 15.
144. The OAU Convention defines the term "refugee" as:

1. ... every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
2. The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave
his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his
country of origin or nationality.
Id art. I. Note that this definition is broader than that of the Refugee Convention/Protocol.
See supra note 99 (setting forth the "refugee" definition of the Refugee Convention/Protocol).
145. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, supra
note 15, art. 11(3).
146. Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees, supra note 17.
147. Id art. 11(3) (emphasis added).
148. Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, and Venezuela. STENBERG, supra note 135, at 261.
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principle of non-refoulement
includes the prohibition of rejection at
149
the frontier.
In Europe, the Council of Europe Resolution 14 (1967) seeks to
"ensure that no one shall be subjected to refusal of admission at the
frontier, rejection, ... or any other measure which would have the
result of compelling him to return to, or remain in, a territory where
he would be in danger of persecution."'' 0
The Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a similar recommendation
in 1984, linking it to Article 3 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. While the
European Convention itself does not prohibit the rejection of aliens
from the frontier, in Article 3 it prohibits torture, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment."' The 1984 Recommendation
of the Committee of Ministers states inter alia:
Bearing in mind the European Convention on Human Rights, and
particularly Article 3; . ... Recommends that governments of
member states ... ensure that the principle according to which no
person should be subjected to refusal of admission at the frontier,
rejection.... or any other measure which would have the result of
compelling him to return to, or remain in, a territory where he has
a well-founded fear of persecution.., shall be applied regardless
of whether this person has been recognised as a refugee under the
[Refugee Convention/Protocol]. 5
Additionally, The Draft Charter on Human and People's Rights in the
Arab World proposes to grant to, "[e]veryone who is a citizen of an
Arab country or of Arab origin... the right to leave his own country
and return to it and to enter any other Arab country."'5
Despite

149. Article 5 of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees states: "to reiterate the importance
and meaning of the principle of non-refoulement (including the prohibition of rejection at the
frontier) as a corner-stone of the international protection of refugees." Id.
150. Resolution 14 (1967) on Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution, art. 2, in
COLLEcTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 17, at 305 (emphasis added).
151. Article 3 of the European Convention stipulates: "No one shall be subjected to torture

or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 28, art. 3.

152. Recommendation No. R (84) 1 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe on 25 Jan. 1984, reprinted in STENBERG, supra note 135, at 257 (emphasis added).
See also Einarsen, supra note 65 (arguing that jurisprudence under the European Convention
indicates an emerging implied right to de facto if not de jure asylum).
153. Draft Charter on Human and People's Rights in the Arab World, 1987, art. 8(2), in
DRAFT CHARTER ON HUMAN RIoGs IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 27, at 9.

however, that the Draft Arab Charter is not yet in force.

Note,
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these positive regional developments, and with the exception of the
express duty of non-rejection imposed on states parties to it through
the OAU Convention, states still have no legal duty to admit asylumseekers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED PROTECTION
OF PERSONS FLEEING PERSECUTION
The plight of refugees in the world is not a problem any one state
or a group of states should bear alone. The refugee plight is a
phenomenon of our modem world community and must be addressed
by all states as a global issue. Refusing admission to prevent aliens
from seeking asylum is not a just solution of this issue. Borders
closed to arriving aliens do not stem the refugee flight, they merely
direct the flow of refugees elsewhere."M This creates hardship for
states and asylum-seekers alike. The states with the least prophylactic
admission and asylum policies are forced to bear the burden of
refugee care while the refugees are forced to "orbit" among states
seeking the one that will offer them refuge. Closed borders,
rejections, push-offs, and the like are not solutions that the world
community should tolerate. 5 5 First, these tactics should be rejected
because they unjustly burden some members of the world community,
upset relationships among states, and internally destabilize those
states still admitting refugees. Second, closed borders, rejections, and
push-offs should not be tolerated because they are not a humane
answer to a call for refuge.
At the same time, it must be recognized that in the exercise of
their sovereignty and of their police powers, states have a legitimate
interest in the control of their borders and in the maintenance of
internal safety, two areas affected by the arrival of aliens. Moreover,
the abuse of the institution of asylum for immigration purposes

154. See, eg., Gillian Tett & Judy Dempsey, Refugees Find Doors Boltek Financial
ConstraintsareForcingEurope to Tighten ProceduresAgainst Asylum Seekers, FIN. TMES, Feb.
10, 1994, at 2 (noting that Western Europe's tightened asylum policy has begun to create a
refugee "spill-over" into Eastern Europe).
155. Professor Tomuschat warned against the consequences of prophylactic asylum policies.
There is a clear danger that the liberal asylum regimes of the West are going to
collapse if the societies concerned come to the conclusion that around them rudely
selfish strategies of rejection are being pursued. The political result of such perceptions

might be the beginning of a competitive race for the most illiberal regime.
Tomuschat, supra note 23, at 262 (citation omitted).
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coupled with the widespread perception of such abuse has given voice
to calls for closing borders.156
A system of protection for persons fleeing persecution must thus
be based on the balance of interests of the world community of states,
individuals in need of refuge, and individual states. States should
admit into their territories aliens who seek asylum from persecution
for the specific and limited purpose of determining the merits of the
request for asylum. By admitting into their territories those seeking
refuge for the purpose of assessing their risk of persecution, individual
states would answer both the needs of the individuals and of the
world community. On the other hand, states should not feel
compelled to offer to asylum-seekers anything more than what is
necessary to protect them from persecution. This means that those
not legitimately needing protection from persecution should be, in the
discretion of the state, either directed to the proper channels for
immigration or repatriated. Moreover, the concept of a safe third
country, postulating that asylum-seekers are ineligible to apply for
asylum in states other than the first safe country where they could
should continue to be applied to prevent
have obtained protection,
"country shopping.' 5 7 Finally, individuals legitimately needing
refuge should receive such only for as long as necessary to ensure that
they will not be exposed to the risk of persecution in their home
countries.
Furthermore, all states in the world community should share
equally in the care of those in need of refuge. To this end, it may be
appropriate to institute a global fund to which each state would
contribute proportionally and out of which each state incurring the
costs of care of those in need of protection would receive compensation.
In sum, the system of protection of those fearing persecution at
home could be improved by better balancing the interests of the
world community, the individuals in need of protection, and the
individual states. In recognizing that closed borders, rejections, and
push-offs are not a solution to the global issue of refugee flight, we
can focus on making the admission policies of individual states more
open: (i) to minimize the risk of harm to those in risk of persecution;
156. See, e.g., Tyler Marshall, No Longer Welcome in Europe, L.A. TIMES, May 17,1994, at
Al (noting the developments in Europe giving rise to recent tightening of asylum policies).
157. See THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 4, at 46 (noting that

"[a]lthough people have the right to seek asylum, they do not have the right to pick and choose
where they do so.").
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(ii) to avoid the problem of "refugees in orbit;" (iii) to spread the
responsibility of care for individuals in need of protection from
persecution throughout the world community of states; and (iv) to
avoid the destabilization of those states that still admit asylum-seekers
by forcing upon them disproportionately large groups of aliens.
Recognizing that some states find themselves with more asylumseekers at their frontiers than others, a global system of burdensharing should be devised and implemented.

